A large literature discusses the effects of bank capital requirements on lending. The contribution of this paper is to empirically quantify this effect on the cost of bank credit. On average, banks increased tier one capital ratios by 4 percent from 2008 through 2011. This increase in bank capital raised the cost of borrowing by 20 basis points. I identify this effect using heterogeneity in the timing of banks raising capital. To address endogeneity concerns, I deploy various cuts of the data, control groups, differences in risk weights, and an instrument for changes in bank capital. These various identification approaches consistently estimate that for each percentage point increase in bank capital, bank loan rates increase by approximately 5 basis points.
I.

Introduction
Financial regulators are developing increasingly sophisticated tools to promote financial stability. At the core of these methods is capital regulation of financial intermediaries. Basel III, through the Supplementary Leverage Ratio, requires that all US banks maintain a minimum capital ratio of 3 percent and 5 percent for globally systematically important banks.
2 The implementation of capital requirements following the recent financial crisis is mired by a longstanding debate associated with the costs of bank capital requirements. In an open letter to the Financial Times, twenty professors argued in favor of higher bank capital requirements. The letter highlights the social benefits of a healthier banking system: reduced probability of financial crises. Of note is reference to common banking rebuttals: "equity requirements would restrict lending and impede growth." 3 This debate is at the forefront of proposed policy changes to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 4 The contribution of this paper is to quantify the effect of bank capital requirements on the cost of credit.
Discussing the costliness of equity capitalization implies greater funding costs for banks with more equity. Such a change in funding costs deviates from Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM) . A common such deviation is through the tax subsidy of debt. Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) add taxes to the model of MM and find that the frictions of raising capital are likely to be more expensive than the present value of higher capital ratios. In addition to any tax benefits, Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) find that government guarantees subsidized bank equity holders by $282 billion dollars over the financial crisis. Such government guarantee of bank debt similarly breaks MM and raises the costs of equity capital. These types of deviations from MM are due to distortionary transfers, which Admati et al. (2013) cover in depth. In contrast, suppose that banks have a technological advantage to issuing debt. A plausible such technological advantage may be in the funding advantage of deposits (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) . Gornall and Strebulaev (2015) find supply chain effects which lower credit costs of highly leveraged banks. Bank technological advantages to issuing debt deviates from MM in a manner that generates socially costly equity capital for banks. I am agnostic about the reason equity is a more expensive source of capital for banks. To contribute to this debate, I quantify the effect of bank capital requirements on loan pricing. By measuring pass-through effects on loans, I identify an economy-wide effect of bank capital requirements.
To empirically quantify this, I measure the change in bank credit pricing following an increase in reported tier one capital. On aggregate, tier one capital for US banks increased from a steady 8.5 percent prior to the financial crisis to 12 percent (see Figure 1 ). This change occurred heterogeneously in magnitude and timing. Deleveraging of banks happened at the behest of financial regulators. Both theory and practitioners document that bank leverage increases shareholder value. Admati et al. (2016) describe from contracting theory the Leverage Ratchet Effect, where shareholders prefer greater leverage. From a practitioner's perspective, financial markets primarily value banks based on return on equity. Begenau and Stafford (2017) find about 70 percent of the cross-sectional variation in bank valuation multiples may be explained by ROE. Banks with high ROE due to high leverage receive high market valuations.
Using heterogeneity in raising tier 1 capital requirements, I find that bank loans costs increased by 20 basis points. As capital regulations were slowly implemented following the recent financial crisis, tier one capital ratios increased from 8.5 to 12 percent. For each unit of increased capital, syndicated loan spreads increased by about 5 basis points. These findings are robust to controls for macroeconomic conditions, firm characteristics, year fixed effects, and time invariant borrower industry unobservables. These estimates are broadly consistent with theoretical models, which calibrate the increased cost of bank capital. Baker and Wurgler (2015) use empirical data on the low-risk anomaly 5 to estimate an 8.5 basis point effect per percentage point of additional bank equity capital. From a standard MM model with taxes, Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) estimate about a 3.5 basis point effect per percent of additional bank capital.
Despite a battery of controls identification concerns persist. To confirm the direction of the effect, I use the cleanest cut of the data: firms with multiple debt issuances. In a Kwaja and Mian (2008) style, I subsample to firms that borrow from more than one bank and firms that borrow from both a bank and the bond market. I find that the difference in borrowing rates is positively associated with the difference in bank capital. For a firm that borrows from two banks within a year, credit from the bank with more capital is costlier. Similarly, the spread between a bank loan and bond yield for a firm is positively associated with the bank's capital. In effect, I find that greater bank capital requirements increase the cost of bank credit.
To assess the robustness of the magnitude of the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, I use the bond market as a control group. Changes to aggregate bank capital may effect both bond and bank markets. For example, banks underwrite and intermediate bond issuances. However, bank capital requirements do not directly impact the funding costs of investors. I estimate an incremental effect of bank capital requirements on the cost of bank credit, relative to bond issuances. An additional percent of bank capital incrementally increases the cost of bank credit by 5 basis points.
To verify the bank capital requirements channel, I perform a placebo test using the pricing of bank credit lines. Credit lines are commitments by banks to lend a maximum amount on specified terms: maturity, rate, and commitment fee. 6 Prior to the implementation of Basel III, the unused portion of credit lines had a risk weighting of 0%. The used portion of credit lines, similar to all corporate loans, bore 100% risk weight. For the same lending contract, the bank prices a capital requirement sensitive component and an unsensitive component. The pricing of credit line commitment fees should be unrelated to bank capital requirements. However, the borrowing rate on credit lines should be positively related to bank capital requirements. Using the subsample of syndicated credit line loans, I verify the placebo test. Credit line commitment fees do not vary with bank capital requirements, while the borrowing rate increases by 5 basis points for each additional percentage point of tier one capital.
As a final robustness check, I instrument for changes to bank capital. Bank equity returns over the Federal Reverse's announcement of stress test results from 2011 to 2015 predict changes to bank tier one capital. The relevance of the variable is evident from the purpose of the stress test: assess whether banks have sufficient capital (DFAST, 2016) . However, there are endogeneity concerns about market return of banks following the stress test results. Investors and banks may learn about credit market conditions through the stress test. Negative equity returns may reflect worsening credit risk, which would motivate banks to raise capital and increase loan rates. To address this concern, I demean the market equity return of banks following the stress test results. Consequently, I am identifying only on the heterogeneity of bank stress test results. Any endogeneity concern must line up with the particular ordering of bank equity returns following the stress test. This instrumented variation in bank capital yields slightly larger estimated effects. A predicted increase of one percent of tier one capital increased syndicated loans spread by 15 basis points. Part of this larger effect may be transitory. Banks that performed most poorly in the stress test may be pushing to decrease their risk weighted assets before the next stress test.
Interpreting these effects depends on whether bank equity capital is expensive due to distortionary transfers or technological advantages to issuing debt. Suppose that it is due to distortionary incentives for debt capital, then interpret the effect as a decrease in bank borrowing subsidies. However, if banks add value by issuing debt, then these 20 basis points represent a social welfare cost to bank capital regulation. Although small, this credit cost applies to all bank loans: 235 billion dollars of consumer loans and 1,870 billion dollars of commercial and industrial loans. 
II. Bank Capital Requirements
First, I document the heterogeneity of timing and magnitude by which bank capital requirements propagated through banks. I characterize this heterogeneity as driven by regulatory enforcement. Due to subjective stress test metrics and different risk exposures, banks differed in their recapitalization. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of tier one capital: the level increases and distribution widens following the financial crisis. This variation in the time series and cross section of bank capital ratios is crucial for identifying an effect on the cost of bank credit.
Bank capital ratios increased during the financial crisis, implying a safer banking system. However, measures of bank stress peaked. Figure 1 portrays a puzzling positive relationship with bank capital reserves and market leverage. When banks have more book equity relative to risk weighted assets, banks also have less market equity relative to assets. He, Kelly and Manela (2016) show that innovations to a market measure of bank capital prices the cross section of asset returns. In short, the market leverage of banks matters for asset risk premia. This is consistent with the characterization of market leverage as a measure of the capital constraint of financial intermediaries. The mechanism for this is through the pricing of corporate default swaps. Short term bank debt is a combination of a risk-free asset with a small sliver of bank equity. 8 In effect, bank credit risk is primarily priced based on variation in the market value of bank equity. However, the primary regulatory measure for bank reserves is positively correlated with the market measure of bank capital scarcity.
To resolve this tension, interpret market leverage as a measure of bank risk and changes to aggregate bank tier one capital reserves to reflect greater regulatory requirements. Safe banks may have both low market leverage and high tier one capital ratios in levels. Aggregate bank capital reserves increased from 8 percent of risk weighted assets prior to the financial crisis of 2008 to 12 percent in 2010. This reflected more regulatory pressure, not a healthier banking system. New banking regulation expanded the discretionary enforcement of bank capital.
The increased enforcement of bank capital requirements included both strict rules and qualitative judgement. Under Basel III, banks are required to have a minimum capital ratio of 4.5% of risk weighted assets with an additional 1%-3.5% for systemically important financial institutions.
9 Complementing these explicit requirements, regulators use discretion in maintaining financial stability. The primary example of the Federal Reserve's discretionary enforcement of capital reserves is the stress test. Through the DFAST (Dodd Frank-Act Stress Test), the federal reserve assesses the ability of banks to maintain sufficient capital reserves under a variety of adverse economic conditions. A core purpose of this assessment is to ensure that banks "continue lending to support real economic activity, even under adverse economic conditions."
10 For the smaller banks, the FDIC regulators similarly use hard rules and judgement. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2016) use computational linguistics to study how regulators use both discretionary qualitative and quantitative information in regulating banks. The addition of discretionary enforcement of a buffer of capital explains why all banks do not have the minimum amount of capital.
Variation in bank capital reflects regulatory enforcement. Abnormal bank equity returns following the announcement of stress test results predict changes to bank capital ratios. A bank's tier one capital ratio increases by 11 basis points for each 1% below average return. This effect is unique to market returns following the announcement of stress test results. There is no effect of market returns one month prior and after the stress test on bank capital.
11 Regulatory action and negative market returns jointly predict increased tier one capital reserves. Although unsurprising, these results highlight regulatory scrutiny as a determining factor of bank capital reserves.
III. Data
Despite the lack of a US credit registry, Retuers Loan Pricing corporation provides data on bank loans derived from SEC filings. This DealScan dataset primarily includes larger, syndicated bank loans. These syndicated loans are between one borrower and a group of lenders. The lead lender negotiates the loan terms for the group. From the DealScan dataset, I construct a panel of lead lender and borrower pairs with the associated loan pricing terms. The matching of loan data to firm and lender data follows the standard established by Chava and Roberts (2008) and Schwert (2016) . I expand the matching to lenders in Schwert (2016) to include all bank holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve. Complementing the DealScan dataset on bank loans, I use Thompson Reuter's SDC Platinum for data on bond market issuances of the firms.
Through variation in lead lender's tier one capital ratio and market leverage, I identify supply side effects on loan pricing. Lender and firm balance sheet and market leverage information are from Compustat and CRSP. Additionally, I use probability of default data to measure firm credit risk; the data is sourced from the Singapore Risk Management Institute's CRI database. Following Botsch and Vanasco (2016) , I measure the loan borrowing rate as the all-in drawn spread over LIBOR and exclude non-standard loans.
12 For the credit line pricing placebo test, I use DealScan data on the pricing of facility fees: all-un drawn spread. Credit lines typically include a borrowing rate for the portion utilized and a fee on the portion unutilized. Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2015) extensively describe the complex details of loan pricing. Although the DealScan dataset begins coverage in 1981, data is exceptionally sparse until the late 1990's. Many of the identification approaches depend on sufficient variation in bank tier one capital ratios and firms having borrowed from multiple lead lenders. Consequently, I limit the sample to loans initiated after 2000 through 2015. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data.
IV. Empirical Identification and Results
The primary contribution of this paper is to document an effect of capital requirement on the pricing of bank credit. A large literature theoretically models the effect of capital requirements on bank cost of capital. I focus on the real economic effect of greater bank capital requirements on the cost of bank credit. The pass-through of bank capital cost changes to lending may reflect a variety of market frictions and features. To identify this effect, I employ a variety of methods with various cuts of the data.
i.
One Firm and Two Banks & One Firm, a Bank Loan, and a Bond Issuance
Using the cleanest cut of the data, I establish that greater bank capital requirements increase the cost of bank credit. This directional evidence follows from two subsamples of the data: firms that borrow from more than one bank and firms that borrow from both a bank and the bond market. This identification style is similar to Kwaja and Mian (2008) ; I use initial loan pricing rather than a time series of volumes. I regress the difference in the borrowing rate of bank loans on the difference in the bank tier one capital ratios. Formally, the specification is
where , , is the bank loan rate for borrower , lead bank , made at time . The second loan has a , , for the same borrower , different lead bank , made at time , where | − | ≤ 365 days. I control for time trends using time fixed effects, . The sole explanatory variable of interest is ( , − , ), the difference between bank 's and bank ′ capital ratios. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. This identification nets out any borrower characteristics and identifies an association between bank capital and loan rates. Similarly, for the bank to bond comparison, I regress the difference in the bank rate less the bond rate on the bank lender's tier one capital ratio. 
This specification also nets of borrower characteristics, while highlighting the relationship between the bank-bond spread and bank capital. Note that I include separate time fixed effects for the bond market and bank credit, which allows the two markets to have different time trends.
Higher bank capital requirements is associated with higher bank loan rates relative to both other bank loans and bonds. Table 2 presents the results. One firm that borrows from two different banks within a year pays more for the loan from the bank with a higher tier one capital ratio. The difference is an additional 3.12 basis points for each percentage point difference in bank capital. Bank borrowing rates are on average about 3% cheaper than bond yields. However, this spread narrows when banks have more capital. For a firm borrowing from both markets within a year, the bank loan becomes relatively more expensive when banks report higher tier one capital ratios. Bank credit costs increase by 7.31 basis points relative to public credit for each additional percentage point of bank capital.
ii.
Full Sample with Controls
Complementing the subsample of multi-borrowing firms, I estimate the effect of greater capital requirements on the full sample. In doing so, I comprehensively control for borrower characteristics and present several robust cuts of the bank loan data.
Without differencing out borrower characteristics, the primary identification challenge relates to borrower riskiness and demand for bank credit. For borrower riskiness, I include borrower 4 digit SIC industry fixed effects to capture time invariant unobservable characteristics. To control for time varying characteristics, I control for borrower probability of default. Default probability is estimated from a distance to default measure (volatility adjusted book leverage). 13 Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) document that distance to default explains a substantial portion of the term structure of conditional future corporate default probabilities. I use the firm's market leverage to supplement the book measure of default probability. I include borrower profitability to measure demand for bank credit. Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2015) document that firm investment increases primarily in response to high profits and stock returns, not interest rates. Additionally, I control for borrower size as a rough proxy of the firm's bargaining power relative to the bank.
To rule out potential confounding effects, I include a set of time series controls. I use time fixed effects to capture trends in the cost of bank credit. To control for individual bank credit risk, I use market leverage: market equity and book debt all divided by market equity. I control for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) to capture broad financial market risk aversion and uncertainty. Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca (2013) decompose the VIX into two components: investor risk taking appetite and expected stock market volatility.
14 Similarly, I control for volume in the secondary market for bank loans. As more loans are resold, banks are increasingly intermediating credit. If demand for loans in the secondary market is high, banks may act as credit intermediaries and pass on lower credit spreads. Other channels by which this may impact loan prices are partially ruled out by Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2012) . They find that this securitization does not suffer from large adverse selection effects. Other controls include loan-specific features such as maturity and size.
Given these controls, I assess the effect of bank capital requirements on loan pricing. I hypothesize that the cost of bank credit increases with bank capital requirements. Formally, the specification is
where , , is the yield spread on a loan for borrower , lead bank and time against LIBOR.
, is the tier one capital ratio of the lead bank in the syndicate. Controls, , , are discussed in detail above. Standard errors are double clustered by four digit SIC industry and time, following Petersen (2009). Clustering by industry is particularly apt because bank loans prices may be heuristically benchmarked against a firm's industry comparables.
For each additional percentage point of capital, bank credit costs increased by 5 basis points. From 2008 to 2011, aggregate bank capital increased from 8% to 12%, corresponding to a increase in bank credit costs of 20 basis points. Table 3 presents these findings. Column (1) does not include borrower industry or time fixed effects. Column (2) includes borrower industry and year fixed effects to capture unobservable differences among industries and time trends in the bank credit market. Column (4) includes the controls and fixed effects. The coefficients on the control variables are robustly in the expected direction. Borrower riskiness metrics (probability of default and leverage) are associated with higher spreads. Larger and more profitable firms with more valuable earnings (Size and ROA) borrow at lower rates.
Across all specifications, I find a positive and significant coefficient on bank capital. The magnitude of the coefficient is smallest, but most robust, when I estimate over variation limited to within industry and year. Firms borrowing from lenders that have implemented higher equity capital requirements pay more for loans. These firms borrow at an additional 5.16 basis points for each additional percent of bank capital. However, for the market measure of bank risk, I find a consistent positive coefficient. Riskier lenders with higher market leverage charge more for loans. This negative coefficient on reported leverage and positive coefficient on market leverage is consistent with a supply shock characterization of bank capital requirements. The implementation of regulatory capital requirements reflects in changes to bank capital. Market leverage measures the riskiness of a bank.
This effect of bank capital requirements appears to be heterogeneous among firm quality. Firms with low five-year probability of default are less effected than risky firms. Table 4 cuts the dataset into two sets of firms: those with a five-year default probability below 0.5% and those above 5%. For the low risk firms, I find a positive, but small and statistically insignificant effect of bank capital requirements on bank credit costs (Column 1). However, high risk firms experienced an even greater increase to bank credit costs in association with bank capital requirements. Column (2) documents an increase of 6.73 basis points for each unit of additional bank capital. The economic explanations for this differential are many. Financial regulation may have more so disciplined risky, rather than safe, bank lending. Banks may be more able to offload safe loans with low information asymmetry. This finding is consistent with a large, significant negative effect of loan resale on borrowing rates of the low risk group, but insignificant effect on the risky group. However, this explanation is at odds with Drucker and Puri (2009) who find that all else equal banks offload riskier debt. 15 Begenau, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2015) characterize bank risk exposures and shed light on methods to estimate offbalance sheet exposures. There is interesting future work to be done in this area.
iii.
Bank Credit Costs vs Bond Market Yields
I estimate the incremental effect of lender-specific capital regulation on bank credit relative to bond issuances. Changes to bank capital requirements may have spillover effects or coincide with other changes to credit markets. Besides these aggregate effects, bank capital regulation directly impacted bank funding costs, but not bond market investors. This incremental estimate is robust to any confounding factors that are not specific to bank credit.
The effect of capital regulation has a direct impact on bank loans, but not for bond issuances. In the latter, investors bear the credit risk on their balance sheets. Investors balance sheets are not directly impacted by greater bank capital requirements. I hypothesize that the interaction effect between a bank loan dummy and bank capital increases borrowing costs. This tests the incremental effect of bank capital on bank credit costs relative to bond yields:
This identification allows for bank capital regulation to have an aggregate effect on credit. A market microstructure example of such a channel is the intermediation of banks in the bond issuance process. In the sample, 24% of firms borrow from both the bond market and banks. Using this variation, I estimate an incremental effect of bank capital requirements on the cost of bank credit.
Relative to bond yields, the incremental effect of an additional percent of bank capital on bank credit costs is 5.36 basis points. Table 5 documents a robust positive coefficient on the interaction of a bank loan dummy and bank capital. The most robust specification: Column (3) includes controls, time trends for both bank and bond markets, and borrower fixed effects. Of note is that bank loans tend to be on average cheaper by 3%. The effect of bank capital requirements and riskiness is positively, but insignificantly related to aggregate credit costs. However, the two are incrementally significantly increasing the cost of bank credit. I include Column (1) with only the bank supply variables and loan dummy to highlight that these variables explain 34% of the variation in borrowing rates. With all of the controls, the specification (equation 4, Column (3)) explains 83% of the variation in borrowing rates.
iv. Credit Line Placebo Test
Prior to the implementation of Basel III, credit lines contained features with 0% risk weight and 100% risk weight. 16 A credit line is a commitment of a lender to make available funds to a borrower on demand. The contract stipulates a borrowing rate for the portion of the credit line used and an interest rate on the unused portion (commitment fee). For bank capital requirements, the utilized portion of credit lines bear a 100% risk weight, while the unused portion has 0% risk weight. The pricing of the borrowing rate depends on bank capital requirements. A drawdown on a credit line increases the risk weighted assets of the bank, requiring the bank to raise capital to maintain its tier one capital ratio. However, committing to make available additional capital upon demand is an off-balance sheet exposure. This does not change the banks regulatory risk weighted assets or capital ratio. I hypothesize that the borrowing rate for bank credit lines depends on bank capital requirements, but the commitment fee does not. The latter serves as a placebo test. If variation in bank capital also explains the pricing of the 0% risk weight portion of credit lines, a confounding effect is at hand.
Credit line borrowing rates increase by 5.16 basis points with each additional percent of bank capital requirements, while commitment fees do not. Table 6 presents the results. Following equation (3), I subsample to only include bank credit lines prior to 2014 (precludes Basel III). Column (1) presents the results with the borrowing rate on the left hand side. Higher capital requirements increase bank credit costs and riskier banks charge more for credit. Column (2) has the commitment fee on the left hand side. Riskier banks charge more for committing to make funds available, but bank capital requirements have no statistically significant effect. This placebo test rules out potential confounding effects or omitted variables that may generate a spurious relationship between bank capital and credit costs. 
where , 4, is bank 's tier one capital ratio as reported in Q4 of stress test year . , is the demeaned market equity return of bank in the 5 trading days following the stress test announcement. Table 7 documents that an abnormal 1 percent equity decline following the stress test announcement predicts an increase in bank capital of about 11 basis points (Column 1). This instrument has sufficiently strong power: F-statistic 15.25. The relationship between equity returns following the stress test and changes to bank capital is robust to year and bank fixed effects (Columns 2 and 3). Furthermore, as a placebo test, I consider 5-day bank equity returns 30 days before the stress test (Column 4) and 30 days after (Column 5). The coefficients on bank equity returns outside of the stress test results announcement are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The instrument is both relevant and exogenous. The primary purpose to the stress test is to assess whether banks have sufficient capital following an adverse macroeconomic scenario. The performance of banks in the Federal Reserve's stress tests is directly relevant for their capital structure. In terms of the exogeneity requirement, there is a concern about learning. The stress test may reveal information about credit market conditions to investors and banks. Worsening credit risk would result in both negative equity returns and higher capital buffers. To address this concern, I demean the market equity return of banks. Consequently, I am identifying only on the heterogeneity of bank stress test results. Any endogenous effect would need to line up with the particular ordering of bank equity returns following the stress test results.
Using the predicted change to bank capital, I estimate the effect on bank credit costs in the window between this year stress test results and the beginning of next year's stress test. The specification replaces bank capital with instrumented bank capital ( , ) in equation (3): (1) shows the OLS results of using bank equity returns following the stress test results. As expected, worse performance on the stress test implies higher bank credit costs. The channel is through bank capital reserves. Column (2) presents the effect of instrumented changes to bank capital on the cost of bank credit. The effect is larger, but not statistically different from previously estimated effects using the level of bank capital ratios. Part of this larger magnitude may be transitory. Bank credit may be especially expensive for banks seeking to shrink their risk weighted assets before the next stress test.
V.
Conclusion
A large literature discusses bank capital requirements and its effect on bank lending. The contribution of this paper is to quantify such a causal effect. Following the financial crisis, banks raised tier one capital from 8% of risk weighted assets in 2008 to 12% in 2011. This increase in capital occurred through greater regulatory pressures. Both quantitative and discretionary rule changes raised the capital requirements for banks. In particular, performance in the Federal Reserve stress test predicts subsequent changes to bank capital. An abnormal negative return of 1% following the announcement of stress test results predicts an increase in bank capital of 11 basis points. Using the heterogeneity in the timing of banks' raising tier one capital, I identify the effect on bank loan rates. To address potential endogeneity concerns, I use various cuts of the data, control groups, differences in risk weights, and an instrument for changes in bank capital. From these identification approaches, I consistently estimate that for each percentage point increase in bank capital, bank loan rates increase by 5 basis points.
Such a credit supply shock due to banks changing their funding composition from debt to equity implies a violation of Modigliani and Miller (1958) . Understanding the nature of this violation is essential for interpreting the 20 basis point effect. If this is due to a distortionary transfer, such as the tax shield or implied government guarantee of debt, capital regulations are removing a bank loan subsidy. No effect on social welfare. A policy that subsidizes bank loans would perfectly negate the credit supply shock effect of bank regulation, leaving the benefit of a better capitalized banking system. However, if bank cost of capital increased due a technological advantage of banks issuing debt, social welfare is lost. The dollar cost is 20 basis points for all bank debt. Scaled by 235 billion consumer and 1,870 billion commercial and industrial bank loans, 20 basis points are economically significant. These findings highlight the importance of understanding economic mechanism behind why bank credit costs increased due to capital regulation. Note: Figure 1 plots the time series of aggregate bank market leverage (left axis) and tier 1 capital ratio (right axis). Market leverage is defined as aggregate bank market equity divided by market equity and book debt. This measures the capital constraint of all banks within the Compustat Bank Regulatory Database. Tier 1 Capital Ratio is defined as aggregate bank Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets. This measures the equity capitalization of banks. Of note is that the capital ratio metric increased during the recent financial crisis in conjunction with market leverage. This is consistent with regulators requiring higher equity capital in response to banks becoming riskier and more capital constrained during the financial crisis. Database). Lead Lender Market Leverage is the market leverage of the lead bank in the syndicate of lenders. Loan resale is the amount of collateralized loan obligations packaged and sold to the market as reported by Bloomberg divided by the total notional of loans within the DealScan at a quarterly frequency. The ratio is small in part because the DealScan bank loan contracts include credit lines, where the loan notional is the maximum available to be borrowed. VIX is the CBOE volatility index. Maturity is the years to maturity for the debt contracts. Loan size is the natural log of the notional of the debt contract in millions. Borrower probability of default is the borrower's 5 year probability of default (CRI database). Borrower Leverage is the market leverage of the borrower (Compustat and CRSP data). Borrower ROA is the return on assets of the borrower in percent (Compustat). Borrower size is the natural log of the borrower's total assets in millions (Compustat). Note: Table 2 presents the results for equations (1) and (2). The first column presents the results for regressing the difference in two bank loan rates for the same firm on the difference of the banks' capital ratios. The second column presents the results for regressing the spread between a bank loan and bond yield for the same firm on the lead bank's tier 1 capital ratio. Note: Table 3 presents the results for equation (3). Column (1) controls for lender riskiness (market leverage). Column (2) adds 4-digit SIC borrower fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column (3) adds control variables for broad debt market conditions (loans resold, VIX), loan characteristics (maturity, size), and borrower characteristics (probability to default, market leverage, return on assets, and log total assets). Standard errors are double clustered by borrower industry and year. Robustly across all specifications, greater bank capital requirements are positively and significantly related to bank credit costs. Note: Table 4 presents the results for equation (3) based on two subsamples: safe and risky firms. Safe firms have a five-year probability of default of less than or equal to 0.5 percent. Risky firms are more than 5 percent likely to default in the next five years. Columns 1 and 2 displays the results for the safe firms and risky firms, respectively. Standard errors are double clustered by borrower industry and year. There is substantial heterogeneity in the effect of bank capital regulation of bank loan spreads. Risky firms experience larger loan spreads increases with high bank capital compared to safe firms. Table 5 presents the results for equation (4). Column 1 controls for credit supply side effects (lender capital and riskiness, dummy for bank loan). Column 2 includes 4-digit SIC borrower fixed effects and time fixed effects interacted with bank loan and bond issuance (different trends in bank loan and bond markets). Standard errors are double clustered by borrower industry and year. The interaction of lead lender capital and bank loan is robustly, significantly positively related to borrowing spreads to LIBOR. When banks are required to hold more equity capital bank loans become incrementally more expensive than bond issuances. Note: Table 6 presents the results for equation (3) based on only bank credit line loans. Column (1) has the drawdown rate on the credit line (borrowing rate). Column (2) has the commitment fee on the credit line (rate on the amount available). Standard errors are double clustered by borrower industry and year. For every additional percent of bank tier 1 capital, the borrowing rate on the credit line increases by 5.16 basis points. However, bank capital is insignificantly related to the commitment fee. This is consistent with the fact that prior to the implementation of Basel III, the amount borrowed has a risk weight of 100%, but the amount committed bears a risk weight of 0%. Note: Table 7 presents the results for equation (5). Column (1) shows the regression of Q1-Q4 changes in bank capital ratios on demeaned 5 day equity returns following the announcement of stress test results (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . The sample covers only stress tested banks that lend to firms in the DealScan database. Column (2) includes year fixed effects and Column (3) includes year and bank fixed effects. Robustly across all three specifications, a 1 percent higher than average equity return following the stress test results predicts a decreases in bank capital of 11 basis points. Columns (4) and (5) presents the results using equity returns 30 days prior and after the stress test results, respectively. Note that non-stress test equity returns do not predict changes to bank tier 1 capital. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Note: Table 8 presents the results for equation (6) subsampled to stress tested banks and 2011-2015 (months in between the stress test results announcement and the beginning of the next stress test: March-October). Column (1) presents the standard OLS results using the demeaned 5-day equity return following the stress test results. An above average equity return implies a decrease in bank capital from Q1 to Q4, which decreases the cost of bank credit. Column (2) presents the second stage to the IV regression, using the instrumented variation in bank capital: Predicted Lender Capital Ratio ∆. Predicted increases to bank capital is positively and significantly related to the cost of bank credit. Standard errors are double clustered by borrower industry and year.
